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A Cultural Perspective on Intergroup Relations and Social Identity
Abstract
Violent instances of intergroup conflict in recent memory have usually involved cultural
groups, but theory and research on the psychology of intergroup relations is largely culture
free. The two most prominent theories, realistic group conflict theory (RGCT) and social
identity/self-categorization theory (SIT/SCT) provide fundamental insight into basic processes
in intergroup relations: (1) that behavior in intergroup situations is qualitatively different than
that involved in interpersonal situations (including transformations of the self and relationships
with others), (2) competition over material resources is the driver for intergroup conflict, but
psychological identification with a group is sufficient to produce ingroup favoritism, and (3)
social comparisons between groups provide psychological fuel for intergroup conflict. Social
representations of history, encompassing shared knowledge about history and its meaning
distributed across different groups, can be used to derive a more culture-specific approach
to understanding intergroup relations. Empirical results show that popular history is a story
about politics and war, and that historical symbols are part of cultural narratives that can
be used to mobilize public opinion and construct national identity. Universal processes of
intergroup relations and social identity are constrained by societal belief structures, which
in turn are responsive to the identity and generational processes involved in collective
remembering.
This article is available in Online Readings in Psychology and Culture: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol5/iss3/5
Introduction 
While the most violent instances of intergroup conflict in recent memory have usually 
involved cultural groups, particularly those of ethnicity, nationality, and religion, theory and 
research on intergroup relations in psychology is largely culture free. Two of the most 
prominent theories, realistic group conflict theory (Sherif, 1966) and social identity theory 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979) provide profound insight into some of the universal causes of and 
resolutions to intergroup conflict. These theories converge on the conclusion that 
interpersonal behavior is qualitatively different from intergroup behavior. As we shall see, 
different cognitive, motivational, and social structures govern behavior in intergroup 
compared to interpersonal situations. 
Mainstream social psychological theory furnishes an overall understanding of the 
processes involved in intergroup conflict, but falls short of explaining the psychological 
bases of protracted and difficult to resolve conflicts between ethnic and national groups, 
like those in Northern Ireland or Israel. In these cases, a “culture of conflict” has emerged 
(Bar-Tal, 2000, 2001; Hammack, 2011). To understand such conflict and its resolution, 
social and cross-cultural psychologists have developed ways to operationalize the political 
culture of a society and apply this to intergroup relations. One such approach is to study 
social representations (Moscovici, 1988) of history (Liu & Hilton, 2005), because such 
historical representations popularly center around intergroup conflict (Liu et al., 2009, 
2012). These representations provide powerful arguments for validating national identities 
(Liu, Lawrence, Ward, & Abraham, 2002), facilitating or preventing intergroup forgiveness 
after war (Hanke et al., in press), justifying social movements (Liu & Gastardo-Conaco, 
2011), legitimizing the claims of one group against another group for restitution or its denial 
(Liu, Wilson, McClure, & Higgins, 1999; Sibley, Liu, Duckitt, & Khan, 2008). They limit the 
ways in which groups can make favorable social comparisons against one another. They 
motivate cultural continuity (Gezentsvey-Lamy, Ward, & Liu, in press; Sani et al., 2007). 
The feedback loop between representations of history, social identities, and public 
policies and commemorations (Olick & Robbins, 1998) creates a cultural background to 
understand intergroup conflict (Liu & Allen, 1999). This incorporates culture into the more 
universal approaches that are typical of traditional social psychology. Perhaps the most 
fundamental universals about intergroup conflict are expressed by realistic group conflict 
theory, so this is the best place to begin. 
Realistic Group Conflict Theory 
Realistic group conflict theory emerged in the 1960’s out of an era when a more individual-
level approach, authoritarian personality theory (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & 
Sanford, 1950; see Altemeyer, 1996 for a contemporary approach to right-wing 
authoritarianism), was dominant. It carries the classic insight of social psychology, that it is 
the structure of the situation, not personal characteristics of the individual (or an aggregate 
of individuals) that determines human behavior (Sherif, 1966). According to the theory, 
intergroup conflict is caused by an incompatibility of goals regarding material resources. It 
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 is the struggle over such material resources as land, oil, gold, and labor that is the source 
of intergroup conflict, not personal characteristics like a prejudiced personality. 
Sherif, Sherif, Harvey, and White's (1961) work at Robber’s Cave was a seminal 
demonstration of detailed predictions of the theory. In the first, interpersonal phase of their 
field experiment, a small group of about 25 normal 11-12 year old boys interacted with one 
another in conditions of normal play. Then, in the second, intragroup group phase of the 
experiment, the boys were divided into two groups and allowed freedom to organize their 
activities. Within each group a structure emerged, with some boys becoming leaders, and 
more central to the social network and decision making of the group than others. Each 
group developed its own norms for favored activities and places. 
In the third, intergroup phase of the experiment, the two groups of boys were brought 
into contact with one another under competitive conditions involving mutually incompatible 
goals. The boys were pitted against one another in sporting competitions for prizes, and 
were brought into situations like a party where there was food enough only for one group, 
and one group was invited before the other one. One can imagine the feelings of the boys 
who arrived expecting a party only to find the other group having eaten all the food. 
The third phase demonstrated some crucial results for realistic group conflict theory. 
It was predicted and found that behavioral structures change as a consequence of shifting 
from interpersonal to group to intergroup contact (phases 1-3). Within group solidarity was 
at its peak when intergroup hostility was most severe. Friendships formed during the first, 
interpersonal phase did not survive the second and third phases of the experiment. 
Interpersonal associations with members of the other group were no longer tolerated 
under conditions of intergroup conflict. This is reminiscent of what happened during the 
breakup of the former Yugoslavia, where even strong interpersonal bonds like friendship 
and marriage were often unable to survive the larger conflict. 
Furthermore, the sociometric preferences for boys (e.g., friendship choices) changed 
between the second and third phases. Tougher, more conflict oriented boys were preferred 
as leaders for conflict. One boy previously considered a bully became a hero. Another boy, 
who was a leader during the intragroup phase, lost his status when he refused to come out 
to confront the rival group of boys during a raid. 
These effects showed that group behavior and structure becomes qualitatively 
different under conditions of involving intergroup conflict compared to an intragroup 
situation. The entire structure of the group, from friendship to activity preferences changed 
as a consequence of the demands of the intergroup competition. 
In the fourth and final phase of the experiment, it was discovered that only a series 
of superordinate goals was able to reduce the intergroup conflict. These are goals that 
require the cooperation of both groups to achieve. Sherif and his colleagues engineered a 
series of crises that endangered the ability of the camp to continue, such as threatening 
the camp’s water supply or having supply truck fall into a ditch. They organized the two 
groups of boys to work together to resolve the crises. For example, boys from the two 
groups worked together to search for the leak in the water supply, and both groups of were 
needed to pull the truck out of the ditch. 
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 These superordinate goals had the effect of pulling the two groups together, whereas 
such strategies as sermons by a priest, negotiations between leaders, and joint social 
activities were ineffective. Throughout the experiment, it was the structure of the situation 
that dictated behavior rather than personal preferences. A resolution to conflict was 
obtained by addressing the conflict situation itself rather than using more interpersonal 
avenues like improving relationships between the leaders or other group members. 
This solution was revolutionary, since the main theories about resolving interethnic 
conflict at the time were the contact hypothesis (see Allport, 1954) and the aforementioned 
authoritarian personality theory. In the contact hypothesis, equal status contact, enabling 
members of different groups to form friendships, is supposed to reduce intergroup tension. 
The mixed results of the school desegregation program in the United States to improve 
race relations between blacks and whites (Cook, 1985; Gerard, 1988) showed that in real 
life, mere increased contact between groups is not enough to break down stereotypes and 
reduce tension. There is something qualitatively different about intergroup behavior that is 
more than the sum of individual relationships or personalities. 
Social Identity Theory 
The powerful insights of realistic group conflict theory were elaborated on by social identity 
theory, which emerged in the 1970’s and became by the 1990’s the most important theory 
of intergroup relations in psychology. While Sherif demonstrated that mutually incompatible 
goals are sufficient to create intergroup conflict, Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971) 
showed that this was not necessary. In the minimal group paradigm (Brewer, 1979), the 
only thing necessary to create prejudice and discrimination between groups is a relevant 
and salient self-categorization, or social identity. Just the awareness of belonging to a 
group that is different than another group is enough to create prejudice in favor of the in-
group against the out-group. 
In the minimal group paradigm, people who do not know one another and who are 
not allowed to interact with one another are brought into a lab. They are classified into two 
groups invented for the purpose of the experiment, like “dot underestimators and dot 
overestimators” or “Klee preferers or Kandinsky preferers”. These “minimal groups” are 
fictional. In fact, membership in the group is randomly assigned, but subjects in the 
experiment believe they are relevant and valid. This belief alone is sufficient to induce in-
group favoritism when assigning rewards to people who are identified only by their group 
membership. Without any history of prior contact, without any knowledge of any other 
members of the group, without any meaning of the groups in society, without any 
knowledge about competence or relative status, subjects in the minimal group paradigm 
tend to allocate rewards in a way that maximizes the difference between the in-group and 
the out-group instead of dividing the rewards equally. So a person who believes that he or 
she is a “dot underestimator” will give more money to another person whom they have 
never met before, but is identified also as a “dot underestimator” compared to someone 
who is identified as a “dot overestimator”. 
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 Subsequent research showed that this in-group favoritism effect (Brewer, 1979) 
applies primarily to rewards, and not punishments (or subtracting resources). That is, in 
the minimal groups paradigm the subjects favors other in-group members by giving them 
more rewards, but do not necessarily mean to derogate or punish out-group members 
(Mummendey et al., 1992). 
These startling results gave birth to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This 
theory details the cognitive-motivational bases to intergroup behavior within persons, just 
as realistic group conflict theory details the structural bases for intergroup behavior 
surrounding people. According to social identity theory, elaborated in its successor self-
categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), each person has 
a range of self-definitions, some of them group memberships. To the extent that a person 
identifies with a group (that is, sees the group as a part of himself or herself), they are 
motivated to evaluate this group positively. Social comparisons where the in-group is 
evaluated as superior to a relevant out-group are necessary to maintain group-based self-
esteem. People favor the in-group over the out-group in the minimal group paradigm in 
order to establish a social order where the in-group is superior to the out-group. 
Of course, in society, there is inequality between groups and it is not possible for 
every group to make positive social comparisons (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For instance, 
in the US it would be difficult for Blacks to make favorable social comparisons for their 
group on the dimension of wealth. The theory details several ways that group members will 
react to unfavorable social comparison. If the negative social comparisons are considered 
to be legitimate and stable, and the boundaries between groups are impermeable, then the 
person will try social creativity strategies like changing the dimensions of comparison (e.g., 
they may be richer than us, but we are nicer than them) or who is the comparison group 
(e.g., we may not be better than other Japanese, but we are better than the Koreans). 
These strategies make the person feel better without changing the actual conditions of the 
world. Or, if the boundaries are permeable, then the person will try to “pass” into the 
advantaged group. This is an individual mobility strategy. The individual tries to become a 
member of the advantaged group and leave behind his or her original group. In 
multicultural societies, such a strategy is called assimilation. Only when the negative social 
comparisons are considered to be both illegitimate and unstable (changeable) will a group 
engage in overt conflict to try to overturn the existing social order. 
Social identity theory is less optimistic than realistic group conflict theory about the 
prospects for world peace. Realistic group conflict theory implies that if there were enough 
resources for everyone, there should be no reason for war. But social identity theory 
implies that the battle is not only for material resources, but for group-based esteem. 
Moreover, the only way to establish group-based esteem is by comparison to other groups. 
Social comparisons for intergroup superiority, rather than a struggle for materials 
resources, are seen as a second major basis for intergroup conflict. 
The primary strategy for reducing intergroup conflict according to identity-based 
approaches is to attempt to change the basis for self-categorization to be more inclusive. 
Interventions attempt to somehow incorporate out-group members into some level of 
identification with the self, be it as a superordinate category (e.g., “We are all Asians”) or 
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 as two positively related groups under a superordinate (e.g., blacks and whites think of 
themselves as Americans while at the same time as acknowledging themselves as 
ethnically different) (see Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993). 
Cultures and Conflict 
The study of intergroup relations in social psychology is centered in experimental or 
survey-based studies that do not conceptualize their prior history. Not surprisingly, the 
main attempt by social psychology to intervene in intergroup relations at a societal level 
(desegregation between blacks and whites in the U.S. based on the contact hypothesis) 
was not a big success. Cook (1985), in his review of the mixed results of school 
desegregation, argued that the theoretical conditions required for contact hypothesis to 
succeed (equal status contact in a supportive environment) were never met, but critics 
have pointed out that these preconditions were not realistic (Gerard, 1988). The historical 
experience of African Americans has been different than that of every other ethnic group in 
the United States. No other group was brought en masse as slaves, and no other group 
has endured the same degree of prejudice and discrimination against them. It is possible 
that the contact hypothesis was insufficient to overcome the long history of conflict and the 
associated power structures that maintain inequality between whites and blacks in the 
United States. 
Because so many societal factors impact on real intergroup conflict between ethnic 
or national groups, social psychologists have struggled to conceptualize psychological 
variables that may intervene in these societal level processes. One promising avenue to 
incorporate societal level processes, and hence culture into the psychological study of 
intergroup conflict is to study social representations of history (Hilton & Liu, 2008; Liu & 
Hilton, 2005). Research on the content of popular representations of history across 
cultures (Liu, 1999; Liu et al., 2005, 2009, 2012) has revealed that intergroup conflict is at 
the core of how mass publics reconstruct the past. 
In a cross-national study involving twelve cultures, Liu et al. (2005) found that World 
War II was nominated as the most important event in world history, and that Hitler was 
nominated as the most influential (and negatively perceived) person in the last thousand 
years. Intergroup conflict constituted between 28-52% (M = 42%) of the total events 
nominated in the twelve samples, by far the largest category of events. These basic 
findings were replicated in 12 more societies by Liu et al. (2009), with the major change 
being that 9-11 (post-2001) replaced events related to the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet block (from data gathered in the 1990s) as the second most important set of conflict 
related events after the World Wars. In African countries (Cabecinhas et al., in press), 
colonization and independence (frequently involving warfare) formed a second set of 
conflict related events after the world wars. So while the specific instances of conflict 
varied from time to time and from place to place around the anchor of the World Wars, the 
importance of conflict in the narration of national identities appears to be culture-general 
(Liu & Laszlo, 2007). 
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 In the specific histories of nations such as Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Philippines, Taiwan, and the Philippines (Huang, Liu, & Chang, 2004; Liu et al., 1999, 
2002; Liu & Gastardo-Conaco, 2010), intergroup relations and political events associated 
with the founding of the state were dominant themes. But the story within which the conflict 
was configured (see Wertsch, 2002) differed somewhat from society to society. In all 4 
societies, colonization was important, but New Zealand's historical narrative was 
configured as a bicultural relationship between its indigenous people and European 
settlers, whereas the other stories moved from colonization to national independence. 
Hence, if history is a summary of the wisdom and experience of past generations, 
then it is clear that the main lessons from history concern behavioral tendencies of other 
groups when it comes to conflict (Liu & Hilton, 2005). 
This makes the position of some nations in international relations more difficult than 
others. Germany must behave more carefully than other nations when sending troops 
abroad, because their role in World War II during the Nazi period is well-remembered (Liu 
et al., 2005, 2009). For example, Hilton, Erb, Dermot, and Molian (1996) found that 
independent of pocketbook variables, the willingness of British and French to enter into the 
European Union depended on how they perceived the causes of Germany’s behavior 
during the war. If it was due to character flaws rather than situational causes, they were 
less likely to want to join the EU, presumably because they did not trust the Germans. In 
general, “collective guilt” is increasingly becoming an important topic in the literature (see 
Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, Manstead, 1998). 
A more general analysis of the role of history in intergroup relations can be achieved 
by examining the structure and content of societal beliefs. 
Social Representations of History: From Hegemonic to Emancipated 
Social representations are societal belief structures that link people to larger collectives 
(Moscovici, 1988). There are three forms of social representations, each relevant for 
understanding how culture-specific forms of intergroup relations can emerge. Unlike other 
psychological variables, social representations are content-oriented. In the theory of social 
representations, content and process are inter-connected. As we shall see, more universal 
processes of intergroup relations are constrained and put into culture-specific forms 
through representations. 
When social representations are hegemonic, or consensual among all groups, they 
are treated as though they were a reality. Because there is little variability among 
hegemonic social representations, they are not useful as individual difference variables. 
However, they can be used to understand how strong consensus allows societies and 
peoples to move together as one, and enact culture specific solutions to their problems. 
When something that is social is treated as though it were a reality, it has the power to 
create new realities through social policies. 
For example, in New Zealand, all groups now consider the Treaty of Waitangi, 
signed between the British Crown and Maori chieftains in 1840, to be the most important 
event in New Zealand history (Liu et al., 1999). This gives Maori (indigenous Polynesians, 
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 a 16% minority) a special place in New Zealand society. In terms of size and negative 
statistics on social indicators, Maori are very similar to blacks in the United States. But 
unlike in the United States, the civil rights movement to improve the status of Maori has 
continued. Drawing from the status of the Treaty, the idea that New Zealand should 
become a bicultural nation has gained momentum. There is a Waitangi Tribunal set up to 
handle grievances of Maori against the state, and the impact of a bicultural representation 
of the nation can be seen in such institutions as universities and the national museum (Te 
Papa). It is reflected in a national psychology where the Maori minority is viewed as 
symbolically representative of the nation at both the implicit and explicit levels together 
with the NZ European majority (Sibley & Liu, 2007). Such a pattern is unique among 
Anglo-settler nations (see for example, Devos & Banaji, 2005 for American data).  
But the representational status of the treaty, while important, is less than hegemonic. 
While an historical representations serve to legitimize the place of a group in society and 
justify its claims for resources, these claims are frequently contested. A counter-discourse 
to conceptualizing Maori as having a legitimate historical grievance for a greater share of 
national resources as a consequence of the injustices of colonization is prevalent. Sibley 
et al. (2008) describe this pattern as symbolic inclusion but resource-based exclusion or 
marginalization. Historical negation is an ideology that maintains white material privilege 
while including Maori as symbolic of the nation: it acknowledges that past injustices 
occurred, but they belong to the past, and should not affect resource allocations today 
because this would create a fresh injustice (against the majority). New Zealand's 
intergroup relations is thus peaceful but contested (Ward & Liu, 2012). 
By contrast, when social representations of history are polemical, or in serious 
disagreement across different groups, they indicate the presence of historically rooted 
conflict. One group may have an historical grievance against another group, and this may 
require special treatment to resolve. Polemical representations indicate “fault lines” in 
society where the relationships between groups may become tense or break. 
Devine-Wright’s (2001) work on commemorations in Northern Ireland illustrate the 
manner in which history can function as a polemic in society. Catholics were found to 
evaluate the Orange parades more negatively than Protestants. Those Protestants who 
participated in the parades (which commemorate the conquest of Northern Ireland by 
British Protestants) were more likely to evaluate the parades positively, to oppose change, 
and to regard history as being a more important foundation of their sense of identity 
compared to those Protestants who did not to participate. 
In Northern Ireland, such a public commemoration of an historical event is used by 
one group to legitimize their position and to build in-group solidarity in the face of fierce 
opposition from another group. The conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern 
Ireland is centuries old. A system of societal beliefs and practices (e.g., an atmosphere of 
collective fear, emphasis on security and delegimization of the opponent), evolves in such 
a situation that makes conflict reduction very difficult. A similar case is found in Israel (Bar-
Tal, 1999, 2001), where Palestinian and Jewish narratives of history are polemical with one 
another, narrating contrasting tales of calamitous loss versus the joyful fulfillment of a 
return to ancestral lands (Hammack, 2011). 
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 The final type of social representation is emancipated. This means that different 
versions co-exist in different groups of society, but they are either generally not in conflict, 
or only in conflict under limited circumstances. 
The current situation in Taiwan is illustrative of how problems of the past can be 
connected to current political situations (Huang et al., 2004). Traditionally, Taiwan was a 
part of China, but Japan took over for about 50 years prior to World War II. After the war, 
the Kuomingtang (KMT) led by Chiang Kai-shek accepted the surrender of the island from 
Japan, and almost immediately silenced local dissent violently. This event is today 
consensually recognized as the most important event in Taiwanese history. While all 
Taiwanese think of February 28th as a tragedy, where one group of Chinese (not native to 
Taiwan) killed and oppressed another group (native to Taiwan), they differ in how they 
evaluate Chiang Kai-shek, the author of the tragedy. Native province Chinese evaluate him 
badly, whereas outside province Chinese (those who arrived as refugees or as soldiers 
with the KMT, or are children of those immigrants) evaluate him somewhat favorably. For 
native province Taiwanese, the February 28^th incident symbolizes their need for 
independence and their mistrust of governance by mainland Chinese. This is a big 
problem because China does not accept Taiwan as a separate nation. Outside province 
Chinese are less vociferous in their support for Taiwanese independence, and feel more 
connected to traditional Chinese culture. 
It is not as though there is often conflict between native province Chinese and 
outside province Chinese. Most of the time, they live in harmony, and province of origin is 
not an issue. But around election time, there are serious differences of opinion between 
the two groups about the future of the relationship with mainland China. Huang et al. 
(2004) found that in the 2000 election, the historical evaluation of Chiang Kai-shek was a 
significant predictor of the vote for President between a native province and outside 
province candidate, even after controlling for demographic group and social identity. This 
shows how history is still influential for political decisions today. And it is not just history 
itself, but its connection to present day politics that makes the representations a powerful 
influence in societal dynamics. 
Social representations of history are considered to moderate the relationship 
between identities at different levels of inclusiveness (Liu et al., 2002). When the 
perception of history is consensual or hegemonic across all sub-groups in a society, then it 
is hypothesized that the relationship between national and subgroup identity (e.g., 
ethnicity) will be positive; if there are polemics regarding history, then it is hypothesized 
that the relationship between national and subgroup identity will be negative for the 
minority group. Emancipated representations are hypothesized to lead to a zero 
correlation. 
In effect, history functions as a resource that can be used to legitimize the position of 
groups in society (Liu & Hilton, 2005). If all groups agree on the representation of history, 
then there is no problem. Alternatively, as in New Zealand, one group (Maori) may invoke 
historical injustices as a reason why they should receive more resources from society; they 
may criticize the current society as unjust or unfair. If the dominant group is unable to 
make concessions that satisfy the disadvantaged group, as in Northern Ireland or Israel, 
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 then intergroup conflict is exacerbated. One group may seek to gain their independence 
from the national group, such as the Palestinian search for a state separate from Israel. In 
this extreme case, there will be a negative correlation between ethnic identity (Palestinian) 
and national identity (Israeli). 
The struggle for history is an integral part of intergroup polemics. Who did right and 
who did wrong, who has the right to this land and who does not, what is remembered and 
what is forgotten, these are issues rooted in history and its representation becomes a 
resource to position different groups as they try to justify their claims (Paez & Liu, 2011). 
Dynamics between Representations, Collective Remembering, Identity, and Politics 
The process through which an event enters into history is only now beginning to be 
understood (Pennebaker, Paez, & Rimé, 1997). There appears to be a critical period 
between the ages of 15-25 where political events are particularly well remembered by 
individuals, but whether other generations share this memory depends on whether the 
event can be connected to current political issues relevant to society. Every 20-30 years a 
society looks back into the past and engages in the reconstruction of events relevant to its 
current political interests (Igartua & Paez, 1997). For example, the Spanish Civil War 
(1936-39) was presented from the perspective of the victors for twenty years, but after 
General Franco (the victor) died in 1975, there appeared many movies from the 
perspective of the losers, questioning how the war affected the nation. As Spain was in the 
process of becoming more democratic after the authoritarian Franco regime, its current 
politics and identity dictated that it should attempt to reconstruct the past. 
Hence, there is a feedback loop between representations of the past and the social 
identities of the here and now (Liu & Allen, 1999; Liu & Hilton, 2005). As we have argued, 
social representations of history limit the ability of some groups to make positive social 
comparisons with others, and facilitate the ability of other groups to make arguments 
backed by the legitimacy of history. Political groups and leaders are well aware of this, and 
so immediately after an event occurs the dominant group and leaders in power attempt to 
present their version of the events as authoritative (Igartua & Paez, 1997; Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001). They may attempt to forget an event entirely (or at least seek historical 
closure, see Hanke et al., 2012), or to present themselves positively. Sometimes, an event 
is so important as to warrant commemoration (Frijda, 1997; Olick & Robbins, 1998), as it 
generates a sufficient level of emotion-driven conversations in society as to create a new 
representation (Rimé, 1997). Such collective remembering is an attempt to establish a 
consensus about the past, and mark it as a part of present identity. 
But not all groups may participate in such commemoration (Devine-Wright, 2001). 
Over time, the political agenda of the present may change; different groups could become 
dominant, and then an attempt will be made to reconstruct the past. Representations bear 
the imprint of these political processes of collective remembering. It will be up to future 
research to establish the causal links more clearly. 
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 Conclusion 
The psychological study of collective remembering and social representations of history 
has developed significantly over the past decade and a half. Societal belief structures and 
generational processes appear to be important tools in developing a cultural perspective 
on intergroup relations in psychology. Universal processes of intergroup relations and 
social identity are constrained by societal belief structures, which in turn are responsive to 
the identity and generational processes involved in collective remembering. 
At present, it is too early to speculative about whether this approach can bring new 
solutions to perennial problems of intergroup relations. Most of the work that has been 
done is more descriptive than prescriptive. But the process of constructing and 
reconstructing consensus about history appears to be an important tool to locate social 
psychological research into the specific contexts where they can be most profitably 
applied. 
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Discussion Questions 
1. What aspects of intergroup conflict would you consider to be universal and what 
aspects to be culture specific? 
2. How do social representations of knowledge influence the conduct of intergroup 
relations? 
3. Evaluate the ability of social identity theory/self-categorization theory and realistic 
conflict theory to provide a comprehensive account of intergroup dynamics. 
4. Describe some differences in intergroup behaviour between a collective and an 
individualist group that you know. How can you explain/understand these differences? 
5. What do you think are the critical historical events and people in your country? How do 
these events/people influence the conduct of intergroup relations in your country? 
6. How would you go about studying the processes that people use to construct a 
historical narrative about themselves as a group? e.g., Would you examine school 
textbooks, national commemorations, family albums, or what? 
7. What do historical processes imply about the resolution of intergroup conflict? 
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